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INTRODUCTION 
CEOs' public communications are considered essential parts of their stakeholder 
management efforts. Specifically, CEOs' oral and written communications pertaining to their 
firms' actions receive scrutiny from external stakeholders (e.g. investors, stock analysts, 
regulators) and members of the media (Conaway & Wardrope, 2010; Kassel, 2017). There is a 
burgeoning body of research on CEO communication. Research evidence, for instance, points to 
the extent to which CEOs' communications influence firm performance and investor behavior 
(Whittington, Yakis-Douglas, Ahn, 2016; Elliott, Grant & Hodge, 2018). Furthermore, CEOs' 
communications have been shown to shape firm reputation and stakeholder perceptions in times 
of crises (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003). In recent years, there have been reports of a growing 
number of CEOs publicly "weighing in" on controversial public policy debates (Chatterji & 
Toffel, 2016; Soergel, 2016). These CEOs are addressing a wide range of societal "hot button" 
issues in the political arena. This trend is considered unusual because it goes against the implicit 
societal expectation that CEOs refrain from being involved in controversial political debates and 
instead focus on managing their businesses. We refer to this growing trend as CEO political 
outspokenness and define it as CEO's public and opinionated expression of personal beliefs and 
values on controversial political issues. Because this trend is very nascent, scholarly research has 
not examined the consequences of controversial political comments made by CEOs on firm 
performance. In exploring this issue, we consider two important contingency factors that 
moderate the impact of CEO political outspokenness on firm performance: firm 's past reputation 
("Celebrity" Status) and history of consumer activism. In the next section, we first provide an 
overview of CEO political outspokenness. We will then present our study's predictions and 
conclude by highlighting the scholarly and managerial implications of our empirical findings. 
An Overview of CEO Political Outspokenness 
CEO outspokenness represents a high-profile executive communication event. Like other 
high-profile CEO communications (Rhee & Fiss, 2014; Whittington et al., 2016), controversial 
public comments made by a CEO have the potential to influence the perceptions of important 
stakeholders such as customers, shareholders, competitors and regulators. We define CEO 
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political outspokenness as a CEO's public and opinionated expression of personal beliefs and 
values on controversial political issues. We argue that CEO political outspokenness on broader 
societal issues and engagement in public policy debates matters to the firm's stakeholders. We 
base this assertion on insights from the broader CEO communication research that shows the 
words of CEOs do in fact influence stakeholder reactions which in turn alter the level of resource 
support and legitimacy the firm enjoys (Conaway & Wardrope, 2010; Patelli & Pedrini, 2014). 
In studying the consequences of CEOs political outspokenness, we consider controversial 
comments publicly made by CEOs on contested political issues. These types of comments 
typically are expressions of CEOs' support for or disagreement with specific policies and 
regulations related to these controversial issues. Second CEOs' controversial public comments 
on political issues are an expression of their "value statement" (i.e. their personal values and 
convictions). 
CEO Political Outspokenness and Stock Market Reaction 
Beyond the mere act of "speaking up", CEOs' political outspokenness has important 
implications for their frrms. One important question in this regard is: how will investors react to 
CEOs' public comments on controversial political issues? To address this question, we rely on 
insights from agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to the 
core tenets of this theory, an agency problem arises due to the separation of ownership and 
control that necessitates shareholders (principals), as the residual owners of the corporation, 
delegate decision-making authority to agents (managers). While agents are expected to make 
decisions that serve the interests of principals, they do not always do so, instead they act 
opportunistically pursuing their personal interests at the expense of principals' interests (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Such a misalignment in interests between principals and agents creates an 
agency problem (Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). In this study, we argue that CEOs' political 
outspokenness will be received negatively by shareholders for a number ofreasons. First, 
consistent with agency theory logic, we expect that investors view CEO political outspokenness 
as an advancement of the CEO's personal political (or ideological) agenda. Second, we argue 
that CEO outspokenness will lead to a negative stock market reaction as such controversial CEO 
comments are likely to create uncertainty among investors as to how the CEO's comments might 
influence the firm's business operations. Further, investors may be concerned about the ability of 
the CEO to motivate and rally employees and managers around a unified organizational purpose 
in the aftermath of controversial public comments. Finally, we expect CEO outspokenness to 
result in a negative stock market reaction because CEOs' comments on controversial political 
issues may lead to public opinion backlash and a negative reaction among key external 
stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers etc.). Given the above arguments, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
HJ: There is a significant negative stock market reaction to CEO political outspokenness. 
CEO Political Outspokenness and Firm Performance-Is "Speaking Out" Good for 
Business? 
While some CEOs may be inclined to "speak up" publicly and share their views on 
controversial political topics, these comments and the resultant public attention may have 
significant implication for their firm performance. We expect a negative relationship between 
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CEO political outspokenness and firm performance for at least two reasons. First, CEO political 
outspokenness adversely affects firm performance because it may lead to stakeholder 
disengagement. Following the CEO's public comments regarding political issues, some of the 
firm's stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, shareholders etc.) and the general public may 
passionately disagree with the content of such comments. By publicly "weighing in" on 
controversial political issues, the CEO may risk alienating at least some groups of stakeholders. 
Second, beyond disagreeing with the contents of the CEO's political comments, stakeholders 
may also express concern that such CEO political outspokenness may attract a backlash from 
regulators and elected officials since these comments are likely to put the CEO and the firm in 
the middle of partisan political debates. Given the above arguments, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): CEO political outspokenness is negatively related to firm financial 
performance. 
The Moderating Role of Firm "Celebrity" Status 
While understanding the baseline relationship between CEO political outspokenness and 
firm performance across firms is important, we propose that the magnitude of this relationship 
may differ depending on a variety of organizational contingency factors. One such factor we 
examine in this paper is organizational reputation prior to the occurrence of CEO political 
outspokenness. We argue that the potential negative impact of CEO political outspokenness may 
vary among firms with good reputations compared to those with relatively poor reputations. In 
particular, we propose that firms with good reputations--particularly those we refer to as 
celebrity firms (Pfarrer et al., 2010)--are more likely to mitigate the negative relationship 
between CEO political outspokenness and firm performance. In the context of our study, it is 
important to acknowledge the context in which the outspoken political comments of CEOs of 
firms with high reputation ( celebrity status) are made. Given their status as celebrity firms, these 
firms and their CEOs are more likely to be viewed favorably not only by the media but also by 
their own stakeholders. Consequently, for these good reputation (celebrity) firms, the potential 
fallout from any political comments made by their CEOs is likely to be limited if any at all. 
Given the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firm "celebrity" status negatively moderates the relationship 
between CEO political outspokenness and firm financial performance such that the 
negative relationship is weaker for "celebrity" firms compared to "non-celebrity" firms. 
The Moderating Role of Consumer Activism 
In addition to examining the moderating role of firm celebrity status, we also explore the 
moderating role of consumer activism in the relationship between CEO political outspokenness 
and firm performance. We assess consumer activism in terms of a consumer boycott, which is 
"an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers 
to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace" (Friedman, 1985, p. 97). 
Consumers participate in boycotts to challenge and transform perceived wrongdoing by a 
company, or perceived flaws in the product itself (Kozinets & Handelman, 2004; Yuksel & 
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Mryteza, 2009). Consequently, CEO controversial political comments may decrease the 
likelihood of purchase of a brand that has a history of consumer boycotts (Okada & Reibstein, 
1998; Yuksel & Mryteza, 2009). This overall concern regarding the negative impact of "public 
controversy" on brands and company sales is best captured by the journalist Kurt Badenhausen. 
In a Forbes article titled "The Business of Michael Jordan is Booming", Badenhausen (2011) 
writes, "Part of Jodan's lasting appeal rests on his ability to skirt anything controversial ... 
"Republicans buy shoes, too," Jordan reportedly quipped to a friend on why he wouldn't endorse 
a black Democratic candidate, Harvey Gantt, in a 1990 North Carolina Senate race against 
Republican Jesse Helms." In conclusion, we argue that if a CEO of a company with the history 
of boycotts speaks on controversial political issues, it is likely to elicit a negative reaction among 
consumers, especially when consumers do not agree with the stance taken by the outspoken 
CEO. The arguments above lead us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (H 4): The presence of past consumer activism (in the form of boycotts) 
positively moderates the negative relationship between CEO political outspokenness and 
firm financial performance such that the negative relationship will be stronger for firms 
with past history of consumer activism. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Sources 
To test the above hypotheses, we used data from publicly-traded, U.S.-based Standard & 
Poor's 500 (S&P 500) firms. To develop our sample, we began by surveying the phenomenon of 
CEO political outspokenness at S&P 500 firms. We searched for all incidents of CEO political 
comments in major U.S. newspapers and other news outlets from 2010-2016. We adopted a 
matched pair design that includes both firms led by outspoken and non-outspoken CEOs. To 
construct our matched-pairs, we used the propensity score matching technique (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Li, 2013). While most works in the past have used a manual matching procedure, 
the propensity matching technique is increasingly being utilized by corporate governance 
researchers given its superior probability-based predictive ability and reduced bias, particularly 
for observational studies (Boivie, Graffin, Oliver & Withers, 2016; Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 
2016). The propensity score matching technique allows researchers to generate a matched pair 
observation of "treatment" and control sample by identifying a "counterfactual". The "treatment" 
sample in this study is all firms with politically outspoken CEOs, while the "counterfactual" 
sample consists of firms with non-outspoken CEOs. Hence, the goal of the propensity score 
matching technique is to provide a matched sample such that the firms in the "treatment" and 
"counterfactual" groups are very similar in all aspects except for having ( or not having) a 
politically outspoken CEO. We identified five covariates that are likely to predict CEO political 
outspokenness: Firm Age, Percentage of Equity Owned by CEO, CEO Gender (coded 0=male, 
1 =female), CEO founder status (0=non-founder, 1 =founder) and French and Fama 49 industry 
categories. These five covariates were used in a probit analysis with the binary CEO 
outspokenness variable (0=no comment, 1 =comment) as the outcome variable. The propensity 
scores generated following this process yielded 122 unique matched pair observations (61 firms 
with outspoken CEOs and 61 firms without outspoken CEOs). Because some firms' CEOs made 
more than one political comment during our sampling window, our final sample consisted of 182 
observations ( 122 incidents of CEO comments along with 61 observations from non-
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commenting CEOs). We collected data on CEO outspokenness from the Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Universe database. Specifically, we focused on U.S. newspaper articles that reported 
controversial CEO comments for the period ranging from 2010-2016. We categorized a CEO 
comment as political if: (1) The CEO comment explicitly mentions politicians (president, 
congressmen and administration officials) and/or political parties (e.g. democratic or republican 
parties), (2) The CEO comment explicitly mentions legislation that is either being considered in 
Congress or state houses at the time or that have recently been signed into law, (3) The CEO 
comment explicitly mentions controversial political issues ( e.g. gun control, deregulation, health 
care reform). The aforementioned data collection process yielded data on 122 non-redundant 
political comments during our sampling window (2010-2016) from 61 CEOs ofS&P 500 firms. 
Measures 
We operationalized CEO political outspokenness as a binary variable by assigning a 
value of"l" for each observation in a given year if a sample firm's CEO made a political 
comment and "0" otherwise. We use firm celebrity status and consumer activism as two 
moderating variables. We utilize the ranking of Fortune Global Most Admired Companies 
starting from 2006 to 2009 as a measure of firm celebrity status (Brown & Perry, 1994; Cheng, 
Liu, McConnell, & Rosenblum, 2017). If a sample company is ranked at least once in the top 50 
lists over the interval of 2006 to 2009, we coded it as "1" and "0" otherwise. We operationalized 
consumer activism as a binary variable. We utilized multiple sources such as the Ethical 
Consumer Boycott list (www.ethicalconsumer.org), twitter hashtags, and Google search to 
collect data on consumer activism. We included consumer boycott observations that occurred 
prior to the comment made by a CEO. If there is at least one consumer boycott event targeting a 
sample firm, we coded it as "1" and "O" otherwise. In this study, we used two dependent 
variables: stock market reaction, and firm performance as measured in Tobin's q and quarterly 
sales. To assess stock market reaction to CEO political comments (hypothesis 1), we conducted 
an event study (Ball & Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969; Mc Williams & Siegel, 1997) using 
'Event study by WRDS', a program provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The 
event study methodology is used to determine whether there is an "abnormal" stock return 
associated with an unanticipated event (Mc Williams & Siegel, 1997). Consistent with the prior 
studies, we used the market model (Rhee & Fiss, 2014; Quigley et al., 2017; Kang, 2008) with a 
120-day estimation period with the minimum number of valid returns of 70 days (Shiu & Yang,
2017). To measure quarterly sales and Tobin's Q, we first identified which quarter of the year
each CEO made a controversial political comment. Then we used Tobin's q and quarterly sales
of that particular quarter to capture the immediate impact of the controversial political comment
on firm performance. For counterfactual observation with no CEO comment, we used the data of
same quarter that we used in treatment observation with CEO comment. We included the
following eight control variables in our study:firm size, past performance, Fama & French
industry groups, CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO duality, CEO equity ownership, and CEO
ideology.
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a significant negative stock market reaction to CEO political 
outspokenness. The results indicate that CEOs controversial political comments, overall, were 
followed by a statistically significant increase in the firm's cumulative abnormal stock return. 
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Contrary to our prediction, our results suggest a significant positive investor reaction to CEO 
political outspokenness. Accordingly, hypothesis 1 did not receive empirical support. Hypothesis 
2 predicted that CEO political outspokenness is negatively related to firm financial performance. 
Our analyses indicate that CEO political outspokenness has a negative impact (P =-0.227, p< 
0. 01) on Tobin's q. However, contrary to our prediction, CEO political outspokenness does not
have negative impact on quarterly sales (P = 0.161, n.s.). Accordingly, hypothesis 2 has received
partial support. Hypothesis 3 proposed that firm celebrity status negatively moderates the
relationship between CEO political outspokenness and firm financial performance. CEO political
outspokenness is not statistically significant (P =-0.089, n.s.) predictor of Tobin's q. However,
political outspokenness was found to be a positive predictor of quarterly sales (P =0.507,p<
0.01) in the case of firms with celebrity status. In the case of firms with no celebrity status, CEO
political outspokenness is a negative predictor of Tobin's q (P =-0.203,p< 0.05). However, the
opposite is true when firm performance is measured by quarterly sales, as the coefficient for
CEO political outspokenness (P =0.220, p< 0.1) is positive and marginally significant. Given
these mixed results, hypothesis 3 has received only partial support. Finally, hypothesis 4
predicted that the presence of past consumer activism positively moderates the relationship
between CEO political outspokenness and firm financial performance. The results indicate that
CEO political outspokenness is not a significant predictor of both Tobin's q (P =-0.163, n.s.) and
quarterly sales (P =-0.205, n.s.) in the case of firms with a past history of consumer activism.
CEO political outspokenness is a negative predictor (P =-0.240,p < 0.05) of Tobin's q in the
case of firms with no past history of consumer activism. However, CEO political outspokenness
is a positive predictor (P = 0.318, p < 0. Ol) of quarterly sales.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper represents an initial foray into the consequences of CEO outspokenness on 
controversial topics of the day. If, as we have observed, CEOs are becoming more inclined to be 
outspoken, understanding what that may mean for various stakeholders will be vital information. 
Viewing our results broadly, an overarching theme may be that CEO outspokenness may not 
only be harmless for firms, but may in some contexts may be beneficial. At first blush, a CEO 
taking a stand on a highly controversial topic would appear to run the risk of alienating 
stakeholders across the board, from customers, to partner firms, to members of the political 
community. However, that did not prove to be the case, as investors bid up stock prices 
following CEO outspokenness. What might explain these results? It is possible that while the 
comments made did address "hot button" issues, the comments made may have comported with, 
and been in line with firm stakeholder values. As a next step, it may be beneficial to examine the 
content of a CEO's message within the context he/she is working. Overall, this study sheds light 
on the growing trend of political, socio-cultural and environmental activism among business 
leaders and associated corporate outcomes. 
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